Properly distributing the burden of a debt, and the actual and presumed intentions of the parties: non-theories, theories and meta-theories of subrogation
By means of the doctrine of subrogation, one person is substituted for another in the exercise of that other’s rights against a third person. In an oft-repeated (if not always apt) metaphor, the person receiving the benefit of subrogation is said to stand in the shoes of the other as against the third party (eg, Patten v Bond (1889) 60 LT 583 (Ch) 585 (Kay J); In re Bell Lines Ltd [2006] IEHC 188 (28 April 2006) (Dunne J); Lowick Rose LLP v Swynson Ltd [2018] AC 313, [2017] UKSC 32 (11 April 2017) [62] (Lord Mance)). However, the shoes are sometimes an imperfect, even an uncomfortable, fit. So, in Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] AC 221, [1998] UKHL 7 (26 February 1998) Lord Hoffmann commented that “the subject of subrogation is bedevilled by problems of terminology and classification which are calculated to cause confusion”, and a great many academic and judicial computer screens have been filled in seeking to allay that confusion. Now comes news of another labourer in the vineyard: Rory Gregson Subrogation and Marshalling (Hart Publishing, 2024); and a very welcome addition to the literature it is too. I am grateful to Hart Publishing for providing me with a pdf download to review here.…