Suppose you see a runaway truck, and seek to stop its progress before it does real damage – what legal claims arise? In an earlier post, I referred to two of the possible claims: first, if you stop it from injuring others, but are yourself injured in the process, you can sue the tortfeasor who released the truck in the first place. Second, if you are negligent in the process, you might yourself be liable in negligence to anyone you injure. But there is a third; if your rescue confers a benefit upon someone, such as the owner of the truck, then you might have an action in restitution for unjust enrichment against the owner of the truck.

This all sounds like a classic exam question, but it has recently happened. Yesterday’s Times has an interesting story raising all of these issues:

Robert Moore snubbed by Royal Mail after he stopped runaway post van

The Royal Mail is being accused of ingratitude after criticising a man who stopped a 2-tonne runaway post van from careering over a busy main road. Robert Moore, 63, an artist, cracked a rib and injured a knee as he tried to stop the Transit van rolling down a hill when the driver forgot to apply the handbrake.

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The question of when unjust enrichment can give rise to proprietary rather than personal remedies is a fraught one. Like Fermat’s Last Theorem, there may be a truly marvellous solution, but it is still elusive. Nevertheless, we are several steps closer to the proof, thanks to William Swadling‘s very important article on (the weaknesses of) Policy arguments for proprietary restitution (2008) 28 (4) Legal Studies 506-530. Here’s the abstract:

Arguments are sometimes made attempting to justify proprietary awards to unjust enrichment claimants by reference to the ‘priority’ such awards supposedly give in the defendant’s insolvency. Those justifications are variously that unjust enrichment claimants do not take insolvency risks, that the defendant’s creditors would otherwise receive an underserved windfall, and that unjust enrichment claimants occupy a position analogous to secured creditors. This paper shows that such arguments are flawed. To award unjust enrichment claimants’ proprietary rights is not to give them priority in their defendant’s insolvency but to withdraw the right from the estate available for distribution to all the unsecured creditors, whatever their order of priority. Moreover, insolvency ‘priority’ is not the only consequence of such an award. Finally, when seen for what they are, viz arguments for the award of property rights, the justifications do not, for a number of reasons, stand up.

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It’s an unjust enrichment case from your M&S. For those who have a taste for this kind of thing, this morning brings momentous news. The teacakes litigation is over! Eventually! After more than 13 years! See Marks and Spencer plc (Appellants) v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Customs and Excise (Respondents) [2009] UKHL 8 (4 February 2009) (also here). The matter had been referred to the ECJ twice, and had returned to the House of Lords after the second reference (earlier stages are: CA, ECJ, CA, HL here and here, ECJ). Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe concluded his speech as follows:

The Court of Justice’s answers to the third and fifth questions did therefore raise the possibility of further issues having to be decided by the national court. But the Commissioners have, after thirteen years of litigation, decided that they do not wish to pursue these matters. The House can therefore dispose of the matter by allowing the appeal from the order dated 21 October 2003 of the Court of Appeal, and inviting submissions as to costs (if necessary) within fourteen days.

Now, the only question is, what kind of teacake do I want with my morning coffee?!…

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